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Abstract. Lawful Interception (LI) is a fundamental tool in today’s Po-
lice investigations.Therefore, it is important to make it as quickly and
securely as possible as well as a reasonable cost per suspect. This makes
traﬃc capture in aggregation links quite attractive, although this im-
plies high wirespeeds which require the use of speciﬁc hardware-based
architectures. This paper proposes a novel Bloom Filter-based monitor-
ing station architecture for eﬃcient packet capture in aggregation links.
With said Bloom ﬁlter, we ﬁlter out most of the packets in the link and
capture only those belonging to lawful interception wiretaps. Next, we
present an FPGA-based implementation of said architecture and obtain
the maximum capture rate achievable by injecting traﬃc through four
parallel Gigabit Ethernet lines. Finally, we identify the limitations of
our current design and suggest the possibility of further extending it to
higher wirespeeds.
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1 Introduction
Criminality is, and is likely to be at all times, a great problem in our society. The
ﬁrst task in solving a criminal case concerns the collection of evidence and the
investigation of suspects. In some occasions, the Police forces need to lawfully
intercept the communications (phone, computers, etc) of suspects, especially
in severe crimes like terrorism, child pornography, political corruption and or-
ganised crime in general. On the other hand, the secrecy of communications is
recognised as a fundamental right in most countries, therefore a wiretap warrant,
issued by a judge, is necessary to intercept communications.
A usual approach for Lawful Interception (LI) involves wiretapping directly
the suspect’s subscriber loop, typically cable (xDSL, HFC), ﬁbre-based (FTTx)
or wireless (WiFi). However, individual wiretapping poses serious scalability
problems, especially concerning cost. Besides, wiretapping at aggregation points,
where the traﬃc of thousands of users is aggregated, is technologically challeng-
ing, but possibly more cost-eﬀective. Such a large-scale monitorisation requires
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fast traﬃc capturing (at the line rate), and high-speed ﬁltering out of non-
suspicious traﬃc while ensuring that 100% of the suspects’ traﬃc is captured.
To accomplish these goals, specialised monitoring hardware is required, for in-
stance FPGA- or GPU-based systems.
Because high processing speeds are required in these environments, the use
of data structures that provide low latency is required as well as specialised
hardware. One possible solution which has been the subject of study in recent
years is the use of Bloom Filters [1] (BF). These data structures permit to quickly
check if a binary string belongs to a registered set of elements with a reasonable
false positive probability.
In this light, this paper proposes an FPGA-based monitoring station archi-
tecture for the high-speed collection of suspects’ traﬃc in multi-Gbit/s links.
Additionally, we present an implementation based on a NetFPGA with 4x 1
Gbit/s input ports where traﬃc is captured, ﬁltered and forwarded to other
output port(s). Inside the monitoring station, the source and destination IP
addresses of every incoming IP packet are checked against a list of suspect’s IP
addresses which are stored in a Bloom Filter and implemented in hardware. This
implementation allows the monitoring station to operate at wirespeed, showing
its applicability in realistic investigation scenarios.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews previous
work related with high-speed packet processing, GPUs, multicore processors and
FPGA based systems. Section 3 overviews the fundamentals of Bloom Filters.
The whole Lawful Interception scenario and the inner hardware architecture are
described in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 shows introduces the FPGA platform
used in the implementation of our prototype, as well as a number of experi-
ments demonstrating the feasibility and performance of our prototype. Section 6
concludes this paper with a summary of its main contributions.
2 Related work
While guaranteeing real-time processing and null network information loss is
a tall order, there are several technologies appointed for this demanding task,
namely GPUs, Multicore processors and FPGAs.
2.1 GPUs
GPUs provide a massive amount of small computational elements, which are
very suitable for tasks that can be parellelised at a reduced cost.
GPUs have been used to provide parallelisation to a wide variety of net-
working tasks. In [2], a GPU-based routing implementation with Deep Packet
Inspection (DPI) capabilities is presented. Such a DPI is both implemented using
a Finite State Automata (FSA) and a Bloom Filter paradigm, and are subse-
quently compared showing that Bloom Filters provide the best performance.
GPUs in the routing context were ﬁrst presented in [2] and further extended
in [3]. In this work, the authors show a direct table lookup (with up to 224
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entries) for routing which highly minimises memory access in comparison with
other data structures such as Tries.
In [4], an architecture for packet signature matching is examined and im-
plemented in a GPU. A comparison between Deterministic Finite Automata
(DFA) and eXtended Finite Automata (XFA) based architectures is provided.
Both of them are analysed and implemented for comparison showing a better
performance and less memory usage coming from XFA implementations.
In [5], another GPU-based packet regular expresion matching engine is intro-
duced. With three optimisation techniques aimed at improving memory access,
the implementation is able to reach 128.6Gbps rate.
GPUs have also been a subject of research in the design of Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS). In [6], a GPU parallelised architecture based on the Wu-Manber
algorithm is shown. The work in [6] was subsequently improved in [7], where
a hierarchical parallel machine architecture on GPU was used to address some
of the shortcomings revealed in [6], mainly the problem of state explosion that
appears when it is necessary to search for complex regular expressions.
2.2 Multicore processors
Another means of parallelisation comes from multipurpose, multicore processors.
In this ﬁeld, extensive research eﬀorts have been conducted in the parallelisation
of packet processing, especially pattern matching, see [8–10]. As a consequence,
DPI has been the most recurring topic in this area. In [11] a parallelisation of
the L7 ﬁlter [12], a DPI extension for Linux Netﬁlter is presented. Finally, [13]
proposes a pre-ﬁltering algorithm to ignore unwanted matches for L7 ﬁlter. This
allows the L7 ﬁlter to get a better eﬃciency for the L7 rule matching algorithm.
2.3 FPGAs/ASICs
FPGAs and ASICs allow full task customisation and implementation in hard-
ware.
FPGAs have been used to overcome the limitation of pure software envi-
ronments for traditional networking tasks such as IP forwarding [14]. The most
popular application of FPGAs in the networking area comprises those related
with pattern and string matching for IDS and Intrusion Protection Systems
(IPS). In [15–18] a parallel Bloom Filter based architecture is presented and
subsequently improved. Another approach for IDS implementation in FPGA is
the Finite State Machine (FSM) paradigm [19, 20], which has diﬀerent pros and
cons with the Bloom Filter approach [21]. Additionally, in [22], an FPGA im-
plementation of a Deep Packet Inspection architecture with Regular Expression
Detection is shown. In [23], a parallel pattern matching architecture based on a
compact reconﬁgurable ﬁlter and a coprocessor for FPGA is presented.
Finally, there has also been research regarding hardware implementations of
ﬁrewalls. In [24], [25] two diﬀerent ﬁrewall implementations are shown. There are
also some combined proposals like [26], which suggest a combination of Firewall,
IDS and rate limiting in the same implementation.
3
Themaincontributionofourpaperconsistsinthedesignofahardware
BloomFilterpacketmonitoringstationarchitectureforLawfulInterception.
3 BloomFiltersbackground
ABloomFilter[1](BF)isadatastructureusedtotestwhetheranelement
belongstoacertainsetornot.ABFischaracterisedbyanumberkofhash
functionsandabinaryarrayNofbitsinitialysettozero,asshowninFig.1.
Fig.1.BloomFilterexample.
Now,considerwewishtostorenelementsinthearray,sayforinstancethelist
ofIPaddressesfromsuspectstobemonitored.Inthislight,thekhashfunctions
areappliedtoeachelementintheIPlistproducinganumberofpositionsinthe
binaryarray,whicharethensettoone.Intheexample,k=2hashfunctionsare
appliedtotheﬁrstIPaddress,settingthethirdandﬁfthpositionofthebinary
arraytounity(notethatthebinaryarrayhas12positions,startingfrom0until
11).AfterthenIPaddressesarestored,thebinaryarraycontainsanumberof
oneswhichcharacterisesthelistofnIPaddressestobemonitored.Thisisoften
referredtoasthetrainingphaseoftheBloomFilter.
Theaveragenumberofonesinthebinaryarrayis:
E(W)=N 1− 1− 1N
kn
≈N 1−e−knN (1)
whereE(W)isoftenreferredtoastheweightoftheBF.
ThisstructurealowstofastcheckwhetheranIPaddressbelongstothe
setofsuspiciousIPsstoredinthearray,justbycomputingthek
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hashesand
checkingtheassociatedpositions.
However,theBFmayproducefalsepositives,thatis,acertainIPaddress
maynothavebeenprogrammedinthebinaryarray,butstilthehashfunctions
appliedtoitmaypointatpositionssettoone.Thisoccurswiththefolowing
probability[1]:
Pfp= E(W)N
k
≈ 1−e−knN k (2)
Thefalse-positiveprobabilityreducesforlargevaluesofN.Nevertheless,
ﬁlteringisrequiredtoremovethefalsepositivesfromtheactualpositives.Given
thefactthataLawfulInterceptionplatformmustnotstoretraﬃcthatdoesnot
belongtothewiretappedsuspects,thisissuehasbeenaddressedinourdesign
andisfurtherexplainedinsection4.1.
4 Systemdesignandarchiteture
4.1 LawfulInterceptionPlatformarchitecture
ConsiderthelawfulinterceptionscenarioofFig.2,furtherexplainedinin[27],
wheretheInternetconnectionsofmultiple(typicalythousands)subscribersare
aggregatedatthe MetropolitanAreaNetwork(MAN). Weassumethatsome
(veryfew)ofthesesubscribersarecriminalSuspectsunderinvestigation.To
investigatethesesuspects,aDigital Wiretap Warrant(DWW)[28]issuedbya
judgeismandatory.
Fig.2.LawfulInterceptionscenario
Inthisscenario,ourmonitoringstation
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colectsthetraﬃcofthousandsof
userstraversingitsports.ADWWisrequiredforanycapturingprocess.This
meansthatthemonitoringstationwilnotcaptureanytraﬃcfromthatsuspect
unlessavalidDWWisprovidedinordertopreventmisusebythePolice,the
ISPoranyotherunauthorisedthirdparty.Themonitoringstationhasalist
ofIPaddresses(ofthesuspectsunderawiretapwarrant)loadedinitsinternal
BloomFiltertodecidewhichpacketsaretobecapturedandstoredforfurther
investigation by the Police forces. Because Bloom Filters have false positives,
packets are ﬁltered at software level at the monitoring station. This ensures that
any packet which does not belong to a suspect is never stored. Additionally,
zero-loss packet capturing is mandatory for the suspects’ traﬃc.
The captured traﬃc is then sent to the Traﬃc Decoding Server [27], which
takes the capture ﬁles produced by the Monitoring Station to reconstruct the
ﬁles and contents that the suspect has transmitted or received.
4.2 Traﬃc inspector module architecture
Fig. 3 shows the architecture of the Bloom Filter traﬃc inspection module, which
comprises:
– Two FIFO queues to regulate input/output to the module, called Input and
Output FIFO respectively.
– A Packet Buﬀer in which some packet words are copied for inspection.
– An Inspector module which checks both source and destination IP addresses
to be inspected.
– User-Space Bloom Filter Interaction module (USBI), which communicates
the User Space software and the Bloom Filter. This module allows to add/remove/update
IP addresses in the Bloom Filter dynamically.
– A Bloom Filter, which is queried by the inspector module twice per packet.
The Bloom Filter is implemented using the FPGA’s BRAM (Block Random
Access Memory). The read and write access to the Bloom Filter is managed
by a priority-encoded controller, which gives priority to the Inspector over
the User Space Bloom Filter Interaction module.
To illustrate how our hardware architecture operates, consider the arrival of
a packet at the Input FIFO (step 1 in Fig. 3). The ﬁrst bytes of the packet are
stored in a Packet Buﬀer (step 2), and simultaneously they are copied to the
Output FIFO. Next, the inspector obtains the bytes that contain the source and
destination IP addresses of the packet (step 3), and checks whether or not there
is a positive matching in the Bloom Filter (step 4). If there is a positive match,
then the packet is captured by the monitoring station by changing certain bits
in the control header of the packet (step 5). Otherwise, the packet is simply not
stored.
Once the ﬁrst word of the packet is allowed to exit the module, then its next
words are automatically forwarded without further checks. After the ﬁrst word
of this packet exit the Inspector module, the next packet in the queue can be
analysed.
The priority encoding of the Bloom Filter guarantees that any operation
from user space which involves the Bloom Filter (reading or writing) will be
delayed if the inspector needs to check the Bloom ﬁlter to classify a packet.
A simple request-response protocol is implemented between the USBI and the
Bloom Filter and also between the USBI and the user space to indicate when
low-priority operations have been attended by the Bloom Filter. Software tools
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Fig. 3. Block architecture of the traﬃc inspection module
are used at user space to ensure that the Bloom Filter is properly recalculated
each time a new IP address is added or deleted from the list.
Two diﬀerent interception modes are available in this prototype, namely
Forward and Tap and Tap and Drop. In Forward and Tap mode, if a packet
matches the search criteria, the packet is forwarded through an output port
and a copy of it is also sent to user space for capture. If not, the traﬃc is
simply forwarded transparently to the output port. The Forward and Tap mode
is intended for a case in which we need to capture in serial mode. This means
that the traﬃc inspector is placed in the middle of the network wire.
In the Tap and Drop mode, if a packet matches the search criteria, it is
forwarded to user space. If not, it is simply discarded. The Tap and Drop mode
is the mode that should be used if we want to have a parallel communication
interception. In this mode, a copy of the traﬃc which is being forwarded through
the network is sent to the monitoring station. This mode allows to tap more
lines than the forward and tap mode because not as many ports are needed to
forward the traﬃc, so the packet inspector has simply to decide if the traﬃc is
to be processed or discarded.
4.3 Design of the Inspector Bloom Filter
This section evaluates the performance of the current implementation of the
Inspector Bloom Filter in the NetFPGA. Taking information from a Spanish
ISP, we assume that an aggregation metro node concentrates the traﬃc of about
40000 DSL subscribers producing an average bit rate of 120 Kbit/s each. With
these numbers, the average bitrate traversing the NetFPGA:
40000× 120 Kbit/s = 4.8 Gbit/s
which is close to the maximum input bitrate that the 1G NetFPGA may handle.
It should be noted that, although the NetFPGA used for our implementation
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does not fully support such an input bitrate, our implementation is intended for
the validation of our design.
On the other hand, the Bloom Filter implementation comprises k = 2 Fi-
bonacci hash functions [29] and a bit array of N = 65536 bits. The ﬁrst hash
function h1 operates directly on the IP address (either source or destination)
whereas the second one h2 performs the hash of a ﬁxed permutation of the bits
comprising the IP address. These two hash functions determine which bits have
to be set in the Bloom Filter.
Fig. 4 gives the false-positive probability for a number n of IP addresses to
be loaded on the Bloom Filter. As shown, for n = 1000 suspect IP addresses,
the false positive probability equals 9.03 · 10−4. This value reduces to 9.28 · 10−6
for n = 100 addresses, and to 9.31 · 10−8 for n = 10 IP addresses.
Fig. 4. Probability of false positive in the designed Bloom Filter for k=2, n=65536 bits
These numbers are somehow reasonable since we do not expect more than
1000 suspects in a population of 40000 users. Actually, it is more reasonable to
expect 10 to 100 suspects in such a population than 1000 suspects.
Finally, the total incoming traﬃc arrival at the PCI-X concerns both the
actual suspicious traﬃc plus that traﬃc due to false positives, i.e.:
120 Kbit/s× (n+ 40000 · Pfp(n))
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This gives a total data rate of:
n = 1000 Bitrate = 124 Mbit/s
n = 100 Bitrate = 12 Mbit/s
n = 10 Bitrate = 1.2 Mbit/s
In general, we observe that:
120 Kbit/s× (n+ 40000 · Pfp(n)) ≈ 120nKbit/s
since the portion of traﬃc due to the BF’s false positives is very small compared
with true positives.
Nevertheless, as we show in the next section the 1G NetFPGA implementa-
tion can handle these values without any problem.
5 Prototype implementation, benchmarking and results
This section introduces the FPGA platform used for the development of our
prototype and shows the results of a number of benchmarking tests performed
to our monitoring station prototype.
5.1 The NetFPGA platform
Due to its simplicity, versatility, low cost and openness, the NetFPGA [30] frame-
work has been chosen for the implementation of our traﬃc capture prototype.
The NetFPGA has been developed at Stanford University and provides a
basic reference architecture for network hardware implementation, particularly
useful in educational and academic environments. There are currently two NetF-
PGA models operating at diﬀerent port speeds: 1 Gbit/s and 10 Gbit/s. Both
platforms have a stable release. Nevertheless, we have used the 1G NetFPGA
for our prototype implementation due to its maturity.
The 1G NetFPGA comes with a Xilinx Virtex II Pro 50 and 4 Gigabit Ether-
net copper interfaces. The reference pipeline has a 64-bit word size with a clock
speed operating at 125MHz, providing a total raw throughput of 8 Gbit/s. Traf-
ﬁc can be forwarded through the NetFPGA itself and also to/from the server
hosting the NetFPGA through a PCI-X bus, allowing the software processing of
packets. PCI-X was conceived as an upgrade to prevent certain shortcomings of
PCI in servers, as well as improving clock speeds. Nevertheless, in more recent
systems, PCI Express (PCIe), with even faster transfer rates, has been the true
successor of PCI.
The reference pipeline architecture of the 1G NetFPGA is shown in Fig. 5.
This comprises eight reception queues, one Input Arbiter, one Output Port
Lookup Module, eight Output Queues and eight Transmission Queues. Con-
cerning the eight transmission and reception queues, four of them belong to the
physical ports of the NetFPGA while the other four belong to the virtual ports
of the server hosting the FPGA.
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Essentialy,incomingpacketsarebuﬀeredatthereceptionqueuesuntilthe
InputArbiterselectsonepackettoenterthemainpipelineoftheNetFPGA.
Thispacketthentraversesoneorseveralintermediatemodulesuntilitarrives
attheOutputQueues(seeFig.5).Finaly,thispacketcangothroughzero,
oneormoreOuputQueuesatthesametime,dependingoncertainbitsofa
specialcontrolwordusedinternalybytheNetFPGA,thusalowingfortraﬃc
replicationandmulticast.
WhendevelopingfortheNetFPGA,theusualprocedureistotaketheref-
erencepipelineasastartingpointandeitheraddnewmodulesorsubstitute
oldonesontopofit.Inthislight,ourdesignreplacestheOutputPortLookup
moduleofthereferencepipeline(shadowedbox)byaBloom-Filter-basedpacket
classiﬁcationmodulethatselectsthesuspect’straﬃc.Thisisdepectedin2.
5.2 Benchmarkingscenario
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ThebenchmarkscenariocanbeseeninFig.6.Thescenarioconsistsofﬁvehosts,
fourPCsinjectingtraﬃcandtheserverthathoststheNetFPGA.Thecomputer
thathoststheFPGAhasanIntelXeonE535QuadCoreCPUrunningat2GHz,
withabusspeedof1333MHzand4GBofDDR2RAMrunningat667MHz.
TheotherfourcomputersarePCsandserversofheterogeneousfeatures.
Topushthemonitoringstationtoitslimits,thefourPCsconnectedtoour
monitoringstationinjectupto4Gbpsoftraﬃc.Inthisconﬁguration,theTap
andDropmodehasbeenselectedwithalfourportsontheNetFPGAtoreceive
traﬃc.FourdestinationIPaddressesaretrainedtoaBloomFilterofsize65536
bits(seesection4.3),oneforeachconnectedhost.ThosepacketswhoseIP
addressmatchwithanyofthosetrainedintheBloomFilterarecopiedtothe
Fig. 6. Benchmarking scenario to evaluate our monitoring station prototype
host computer through the PCI-X bus. To run our experiments, several of the
connected hosts inject matching traﬃc at diﬀerent rates to achieve a total rate
inside the NetFPGA pipeline.
Since a certain number of clock cycles is needed to store the packet and check
the Bloom Filter, the pipeline eﬃciency is reduced as the packet size decreases.
Consequently, three packet sizes have been used in our tests, namely 256, 512 and
1500 bytes, and two capturing modes to promptly identify the bottlenecks in the
PC hosting the NetFPGA. In the ﬁrst mode, packets are written to a ﬁle in the
hard disk and in the other the packets are also captured but not written to disk.
It is worth noting that, due to limitations in the communication between the
host and the FPGA, less traﬃc than is oﬀered to the device is actually captured
by the host. But, according to our measurements, the 4 Gbps injectable to it
can be processed by the pipeline, which is plausible, as it is possible to attain a
raw 8 Gbps bit rate.
In Fig. 7(a), the captured bit rate vs the oﬀered bitrate for the NetFPGA
can be seen. For a packet size of 256 bytes, it can be observed that the main
bottleneck is given by the PCI-X bus, conclusion which is reinforced by Fig. 7(b),
since the maximum number of packets transferable to the host is achieved either
if the packets are sent to disk or not. On the other hand, for a packet size
of 1500 bytes, it can be seen that, if packets are not sent to disk, the main
bottleneck is given by the PCI-X bus bandwidth (but not the transfer rate,
since the number of packets per second is lower than the practical limit achieved
as can be observed in Fig. 7(b)). If 1500 bytes packets are written to disk, the
bottleneck is clearly given by the hard disk, conclusion which is conﬁrmed by
the curve of the bitrate captured to disk for a packet size of 512 bytes, which is
quite similar in maximum bandwidth. For a 512 bytes packet size, both curves
are not very diﬀerent, because there are neither rate nor transfer rate limitations
in the PCI-X bus. The only limit which makes a signiﬁcant diﬀerence is the hard
disk bitrate, hence the distance between both the storing and not storing to disk
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curves. From Figs. 7(a) and 7(b) we see that we have a practical transfer rate
limit of 9 · 104 captured packets, a limit of 250 Mbps given by the hard disk and
a limit of 400 Mbps in the PCI-X bus bit rate.
The CPU is not a bottleneck in any of the cases, since other captures with
diﬀerent Gigabit Ethernet cards have been performed that reached signiﬁcantly
higher rates due to using a diﬀerent version of the PCI bus.
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6 Future work and conclusions
In this article we have presented a Bloom Filter-based packet monitoring station
for Lawful Interception which we have implemented as a prototype on a 1 Gbps
NetFPGA.
It has been shown how Bloom Filters allow high speed ﬁltering with low false
positive probability for a reasonable number of users. Furthermore, such claims
have been supported with aggregation data from a Spanish ISP to show that our
design is scalable to be used in network aggregation points, which would allow
Lawful Interception at wirespeed in said aggregation points with reasonable cost
per suspect. More importantly, it has been demonstrated that, although traﬃc
capturing in aggregation links could be seen as a tall order, it is not only feasible,
but also secure and cheaply realisable if realistic numbers are taken into account
to face the problem.
Several traﬃc capture experiments have been conducted to test the limits
of our design. Our design is able to run at wirespeed by injecting traﬃc at full
speed in all ports of the NetFPGA (4x 1Gbps). We have achieved the practical
limits of 400 Mbps due to the PCI-X bus of the server, approximately 250 Mbps
due to the hard disk, and 9 ·104 captured packets per second due to the transfer
limit of the PCI-X bus. Finally, it should be understood that these limitations
come from the PC hardware used for the prototype itself (PCI-X bus, Hard disk,
etc), but not the NetFPGA itself. It should also be taken into account that our
intention, as a future work, is to port this design to a 10G NetFPGA, which
might be more suitable for current ISP link capacities.
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